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DISENTITLING THE POOR: WAIVERS
AND WELFARE "REFORM"
Susan Bennett*
Kathleen A. Sullivan"
While policymakers debate the parameters of national
"welfare reform," Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) is undergoing a radical transformation.' With a lack
of coordination reminiscent of the familiar complaint, "the left
hand doesn't know what the right hand is doing," a presidential
working group meets to carve out the details of a campaign
promise to transform welfare "as we know it," while the
Department of Health and Human Services, which supervises
the administration of the AFDC program, grants approval to
states racing to exempt themselves from existing federal
statutory requirements before the implementation of new federal
initiatives. By the time the lawmakers agree on a plan to
reform AFDC, they may no longer recognize the AFDC program
that they plan to reform.
AFDC traditionally has been characterized as a cooperative
federal-state program. The basic framework of the program is
set forth in the Social Security Act 2 and in federal implementing
regulations issued by the United States Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS).3 AFDC is administered by each
state, with certain costs reimbursed by the federal government.
States may make their own AFDC rules, provided that those
rules do not conflict with the federal statute or regulations.4
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1. AFDC is the basic federal need-based income transfer program for dependent
children and their caretaker relatives.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617 (1988).
3. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. §§ 201-282 (1992).
4. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968).
742 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 26:4
States are required to submit plans to HHS to ensure that their
programs comply with federal regulations, and must seek HHS
approval each time that they attempt to amend their state plan.5
Since 1962, the Social Security Act has included a provision
permitting the Secretary of HHS to grant waivers from the
requirements of the statute to states for "experimental, pilot,
or demonstration project[s]" that would promote the objectives
of the Act.6 The states sought these waivers with gradually
increasing frequency until 1992,7 when the Bush administration
invited the states to submit waiver requests to "promote
experiments with welfare reform."' States responded in large
numbers to the President's invitation. Since January 1992, at
least thirty states have submitted requests for approval of one
or more demonstration projects to initiate changes in their
AFDC programs.9
There is considerable evidence that waiver requests are not
being scrutinized sufficiently. From 1990 through mid-1993,
HHS had denied no state approval to conduct a demonstration
project and to date has disapproved only one state project. 10
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 604 (1988); 45 C.F.R. §§ 201.2-201.10, 205.5 (1993); Adele M.
Blong & Timothy J. Casey, AFDC Program Rules for Advocates: An Overview 27
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1164, 1167 (1994).
6. Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. Yo. 87-543, tit. 1, § 122, 76 Stat.
172, 192 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (1988)).
7. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., AFDC RESEARCH AND DEMONSTRATION
PROJECTS (1991) [hereinafter 1991 REPORT]; U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
AFDC RESEARCH & DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS (1990) [hereinafter 1990 REPORT]; U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ANNUAL REPORT OF SECTIONS 1110 AND 1115,
AFDC RESEARCH AND DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS (1989) [hereinafter 1989 REPORT].
8. President Bush announced his intention to make the waiver approval process
quicker and easier in his 1992 State of the Union Address. Transcript of Bush's State
of Union Message: 'Let's Build on Our Strengths', N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1992, at A17.
9. See CENTER ON SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY & LAW, REPORT ON AFDC § 1115
APPLICATIONS SUBMITTED To HHS FROM JANUARY 1992-JANUARY 1993 [hereinafter
1992 AFDC § 1115 APPLICATIONS]; CENTER ON SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY & LAW, RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USE OF HHS WAIVER AUTHORITY (1993) [hereinafter RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS].
10. Consistent with President Bush's invitation, HHS did not deny any state
approval to conduct a demonstration project until July 30, 1993, when the Clinton
Administration turned down Illinois' Relocation to Illinois demonstration project. A
review of data collected by the Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law, 1992 AFDC
§ 1115 APPLICATIONS, supra note 9; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 9, and
documents produced by HHS in response to the authors' request under the Freedom
of Information Act revealed no case prior to August 30, 1993 where a state request
to conduct a demonstration project was refused. Most proposed state demonstration
projects entailed at least several specific waiver requests. The data collected by the
authors revealed two cases where HHS refused to grant a particular waiver in
connection with a demonstration project. In both cases, however, the project was
approved and other requested waivers were granted.
Waivers and Welfare "Reform"
Waivers also are granted relatively quickly, sometimes within
thirty days of a state request.ll Waivers sometimes have been
approved before a state has obtained the necessary state
legislative approval. 2 Although the state projects approved by
HHS invariably are characterized as welfare reform experi-
ments, the agency requires little articulation of the hypotheses
a state intends to test, or the procedures by which it will
evaluate those hypotheses. 3 The agency does not generate a
written record of the standards by which it evaluated the
proposal, nor the reasons for its approval, other than standard
approval letters and agreements. 4 The agency even has
approved waivers for states to undertake demonstration projects
which imposed conditions that subsequently were held to be
unconstitutional. 5 The combination of these factors raises
serious doubts about the quality of HHS decisionmaking.
Some features of the approved state projects depart drastically
from the core values of the AFDC program.'6 Projects have
11. See Michael Wiseman, Welfare Reform in the States: The Bush Legacy, Focus,
Spring 1993, at 23-25 (noting that in 1992, HHS approved demonstration projects in
at least six states in the month in which the approval was sought or in the next month:
California (Assistance Payments Demonstration Project), Georgia (Primary Prevention
Initiative Demonstration Project), Maryland, (Primary Prevention Initiative
Demonstration Project), Michigan (To Strengthen Michigan Families), Missouri (People
Attaining Self Sufficiency), and Wisconsin (The Parental and Family Responsibility
Initiative)).
12. See 1992 AFDC § 1115 APPLICATIONS, supra note 9, for a listing of proposals
submitted from January 1992 to January 1993.
13. See, e.g., CENTER ON SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY & LAw, A FAIR CHANCE: CON-
NECTICUT'S WELFARE REFORM PROPOSAL (1993) (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter CONNECTICUT PROPOSAL]; HHS Approves Iowa
Family Investment Program Demonstration Project, SUMMARIES FROM THE LIBR. BULL.
(Center on Social Welfare Policy & Law, New York, N.Y.), Aug., 1993, at 1 [hereinafter
HHS Approves Iowa Project]; Letter from Adele M. Blong and Mary R. Mannix, Center
on Social Welfare Policy & Law, to Elizabeth Barnes, Program Research & Evaluation
Branch, HHS (May 18, 1993) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
14. In a Freedom of Information request to HHS, the authors requested documents
generated in response to AFDC demonstration projects for which waivers were sought
from 1988-1993. The agency produced documents other than standard approval letters
and agreements for only 1 of 26 projects reported.
15. See, e.g., Green v. Anderson, 811 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
16. Included among the core values of the AFDC program as expressed in the Social
Security Act and interpreted by HHS and the courts are the following: that dependent
children be cared for in their own homes, that children should not be penalized for
the behavior of their parents, that administration be uniform within each jurisdiction,
that recipients be treated equitably, and that benefit reductions be accompanied by
fair process. See infra part II.B. See generally CENTER ON SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY
& LAw, THE NEED TO RATIONALIZE HHS DECISIONMAKING UNDER § 1115 (1993) [herein-
after HHS DECISIONMAKING] (arguing that the lack of guidelines for approval of projects
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been approved which impose residency requirements or lower
benefits for recent state entrants, 17 limit the amount of time
that a recipient can collect AFDC benefits, 8 authorize the
reduction of assistance to families whose children are truant, 19
implement across-the-board reductions in benefits to AFDC
recipients,2 ° and eliminate procedures designed to assure fair
process to recipients before the imposition of sanctions.2'
The current surge of AFDC waivers has been undertaken
without regard to standards or discernible procedures ordinarily
featured in administrative agency decisionmaking. Waivers
have been granted without any attempt by HHS to define the
leads to a disregard for the needs of children and caretakers); Lucy A. Williams, The
Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification Welfare Reform Proposals, 102 YALE L.J.
719 (1992) (questioning the assumptions underlying the Learnfare and Family Cap
demonstration projects); Alice Bussiere, States Experiment on AFDC Families Through
"Waivers", YOUTH L. NEWS, Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 1 (describing the history of waivers
and several current proposals).
17. See Stephen Loffredo, "If You Ain't Got The Do, Re Mi": The Commerce Clause
and State Residence Restrictions on Welfare, 11 YALE L. & POLY REV. 147, 165-69
(1993). A Wisconsin AFDC benefit demonstration project precludes benefits if the
applicant has not been a state resident for at least two months prior to the application
for benefits. Id. at 165. A California project caps the benefits of applicants with less
than one year of residency at the state's regular benefit level or the benefit level of
the applicant's former state, whichever is lower. Id. at 165-66.
18. In 1993, HHS approved demonstration projects in Connecticut, Iowa, Vermont,
and Wisconsin which imposed time limits on AFDC. See RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra
note 9; CONNECTICUT PROPOSAL, supra note 13. HHS approved Wisconsin's Work Not
Welfare project in October, 1993. CENTER ON SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY & LAW, HHS
APPROVES WISCONSIN PROJECT THAT TIME LIMITS AFDC BENEFITS 1 (1993). The
Wisconsin project is the most onerous of these projects. Whereas the Vermont, Iowa,
and Connecticut proposals will substitute a community service assignment for AFDC
benefits after those benefits have been received for a certain period, the Wisconsin
proposal will simply terminate AFDC benefits after a recipient has collected a maximum
of 24 months of benefits. Id.
19. The Wisconsin Welfare Reform Project, which was approved by HHS in 1988,
with additional waivers granted in December 1989 and June 1990, requires mandatory
school attendance for AFDC benefits. 1991 REPORT, supra note 7; 1990 REPORT, supra
note 7; 1989 REPORT, supra note 7. The Maryland Primary Prevention Initiative
(approved June 30, 1992), and the Virginia Incentives to Advance Learning (approved
Sept. 8, 1992), impose similar restrictions. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
ANNUAL REPORT OF SECTION 1115 AFDC RESEARCH AND DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS
IN FISCAL YEAR 1992 (1993).
20. The California Welfare Reform Demonstration Project, which was approved
by HHS on July 14, 1992, immediately reduced most AFDC grant payments by 10%
with an additional 15% reduction after six months of coverage. 1992 AFDC § 1115
APPLICATIONS, supra note 9, at 9.
21. See for example, the Maryland Primary Prevention Initiative, the Iowa Family
Investment Program Demonstration Project, the New Jersey Family Development
Program, and the Wisconsin Welfare Reform Project. Id. at 23-24,30-31,48-50; Iowa
Family Investment Program (Apr. 27, 1993) (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
Waivers and Welfare "Reform"
types of projects that promote the objectives of the public
assistance titles of the Social Security Act. Furthermore,
aspects of some of the state reform projects appear merely to
be attempts to reduce benefits under the guise of experimenta-
tion.22
The number of waivers HHS has approved in the 1990s, the
failure of the agency to articulate procedures or standards for
reviewing waiver applications, and the speed with which HHS
has approved demonstration projects 23 has led many advocates
for the poor to question whether these applications are being
scrutinized sufficiently.24 The sanctioning of inconsistent rules
throughout the country affects both the administration of AFDC,
which is becoming increasingly decentralized, and the program
itself because the rules approved reflect no coherent national
vision. The number and extent of the agency's waiver approvals
represent a profound shift in federal welfare policy, complicating
current efforts at national welfare reform. Additionally, because
the Act historically has played a major role in checking state
abuses of the AFDC program, HHS's willingness to exempt
states from the basic requirements of the statute is particularly
troubling.
This Article examines the purposes underlying the statutory
grant of authority to HHS to exempt states from the re-
quirements of the statute, the important role that the Social
Security Act has played as a source of rights for welfare
recipients, the current wave of exemptions granted by HHS,
and the lack of standards for review of state waiver proposals.
Finally, this Article recommends the development of procedures
and standards for review by HHS and urges that adherence to
the core values of the AFDC program is essential in evaluating
the appropriateness of a waiver request.
22. See, for example, the California plan discussed supra note 20.
23. Some states' waiver applications were granted within 30 days of their request
to HHS. See 1992 AFDC § 1115 APPLICATIONS, supra note 9; Wiseman, supra 'note
11. Although the average length of the waiver review process is probably three to four
months, this may overstate the actual time that HHS deliberates upon AFDC requests.
Many demonstration projects include Medicaid extensions for working AFDC recipients
and therefore require the approval of the Health Care Financing Administration, which
administers the Medicaid program, in addition to the Administration for Children and
Families, the division of HHS which oversees the AFDC program.
24. See, e.g., HHS DECISIONMAKING, supra note 16, at 1 (noting the lack of
"standards to rationalize the decisionmaking process and of a clearly defined review
process").
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF HHS WAIVER AUTHORITY UNDER
THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
Section 1115 of the Social Security Act grants HHS the
authority to waive the federal statutory requirements imposed
upon states under the AFDC program. 2' Authority is vested
in the Secretary of HHS to waive any state plan requirement
under any of the public assistance titles which she deems
necessary to carry out any experimental, pilot or demonstration
project that "is likely to assist in promoting the objectives" of
any such title.26
As President Kennedy stated in proposing the legislation to
Congress:
No study of the public welfare program can fail to note the
difficulty of the problems faced or the need to be imaginative
in dealing with them. Accordingly, I recommend that
amendments be made to encourage experimental, pilot or
demonstration projects that would promote the objectives
of the assistance titles and help make our welfare programs
more flexible and adaptable to local needs.2
The President proposed a number of substantive changes in
the AFDC program which were designed to increase the number
of individuals eligible to receive assistance under the program
and to increase the amount of benefits. In addition to the
waiver provision, President Kennedy proposed reducing or
eliminating residency requirements in AFDC and in federal
programs for the aged, blind, and disabled, disregarding all
actual work expenses, and permitting children to save money
for educational, employment or medical needs without having
that amount deducted from their public assistance grants.28
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (1988).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (1988).
27. Message from the President of the United States, Public Welfare Program,
H.R. Doc. No. 325, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 108 CONG. REC. 1404, 1405 (1962).
28. Id. at 1405. A provision which allowed children to save money without treating
it as an available resource was never enacted. Cf. Mercado v. Commissioner, 607 A.2d
1142 (Conn. 1992) (holding that under current regulations, savings of dependent minor
children for the purpose of paying for their college education must be included in their
families' resources in determining eligibility for AFDC benefits); Lynne Tuohy, Ruling
Penalizes Family of Girl Who Saved for College, THE HARTFORD COURANT, May 12,
1992, at Al (discussing the Mercado case).
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Kennedy's message emphasized that the nation must be
prepared to spend more money in the short term on preventive
poverty measures as a way of alleviating poverty and reducing
costs in the long i un.
The steps I recommend to you today to alleviate these prob-
lems will not come cheaply. They will cost more money
when first enacted. But they will restore human dignity;
and in the long run, they will save money .... Communities
which have-for what ever motives-attempted to save
money through ruthless and arbitrary cutbacks in their
welfare rolls have found their efforts to little avail. The root
problems remained.2 9
In contrast to Kennedy's preventive, investment-oriented
approach to welfare reform, many of the state "demonstration
projects" for which HHS has granted waivers in the 1990s have
exempted states from basic AFDC statutory requirements. A
clear indication of the shift in philosophy from Kennedy's
investment-oriented approach of the 1960s to the deficit-driven
philosophy of the nineties is that one of the few principles that
HHS has articulated in reviewing requests for waivers is that
each proposal reflect "cost neutrality."" The federal share of
the state's AFDC costs, if the project for which the waiver is
sought is approved, must be no more than the costs of the state's
plan without the project.3 This principle essentially mandates
that any effort by a state to provide more generous benefits than
those currently provided by the Social Security Act be accompa-
nied by provisions which restrict eligibility by reducing the
number of recipients or the amount of benefits. Indeed, many
state projects for which waivers have been granted include a
mixture of targeted benefit increases and reductions."
29. Message from the President of the United States, supra note 27, at 1407.
30. See Wiseman, supra note 11, at 19.
31. See id. (citing EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT-FISCAL YEAR 1993 pt. 1 (1992)).
32. The Connecticut waiver application, for example, proposes to expand AFDC
eligibility to two parent families, and increase asset limits and earned income
disregards (the amount a family can earn without having their benefits reduced). The
state also proposed to eliminate most exemptions from work requirements and impose
stiffer penalties for noncompliance. See CONNECTICUT PROPOSAL, supra note 13. New
Jersey's Family Development Program denies benefits to children born to AFDC
recipients but expands certain earned income disregards. 1992 AFDC § 1115
APPLICATIONS, supra note 9, at 30.
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The legislative history to the 1962 amendments to the AFDC
program gives little guidance as to the types of statutory
provisions that could be waived as "necessary to carry out a
demonstration project which may promote the objectives of any
such title."33 The one example cited in the House report is that
the single state plan requirement may preclude meaningful
experiments, which by their nature, require a smaller sample
population than the entire class of eligible recipients in a state.
Advocates have urged that Congress merely "contemplated
projects that experimented with techniques of administration
and the delivery of assistance and services defined by Congress.
There was no suggestion that Congress envisioned projects that
limited the statutory entitlements of program beneficiaries."34
Advocates for the poor have not been successful, however, in
convincing courts that the Secretary's power to waive basic
statutory entitlements should be limited. In Aguayo v. Rich-
ardson,35 for example, welfare recipients and welfare rights
organizations challenged the Secretary's decision to grant New
York State a series of waivers to establish a work relief program
for AFDC recipients in New York City and eight counties
outside of the city. The plaintiffs argued that section 1115 did
not permit the Secretary to waive any requirements of the
AFDC statute that would curtail or deny assistance to
applicants or recipients of AFDC.36 Judge Friendly, in rejecting
the plaintiffs' argument, held that the legislative history
established that "'[t]he public assistance titles of the Social
Security Act contain a number of requirements on the States
for approval of a state plan' which 'often stand in the way of
experimental projects designed to test out new ideas and ways
of dealing with the problems of public welfare recipients.' 
3 7
33. S. REP. No. 1589, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), reprinted in 1962 US.C.C.A.N.
1943, 1943; CONF. REP. No. 2006, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), reprinted in 1962
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 1979.
34. CENTER ON SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY & LAW, OVERVIEW OF THE LAW GOVERNING
WAIVER OF FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO STATE AFDC PROGRAMS 2-3 (1993).
35. 473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1973).
36. The program included, for example, a requirement that AFDC recipients age
15 or older participate in a youth employment component, even if the recipients
attended school full time. The recipient's family faced a reduction in the grant if the
young person failed to attend. The program also required counseling for any family
that included truant children and imposed sanctions for families whose children failed
to attend. Id. at 1096. To this extent, the program is a precursor to current learnfare
proposals.
37. Id. at 1105 (quoting S. REP. No. 1589, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20, reprinted
in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 1961-62).
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The court went on to hold that "[tihe limitation, and the only
limitation imposed on the Secretary was that he must judge the
project to be 'likely to assist in promoting the objectives' of the
designated parts of the Social Security Act."38 The court,
although temporarily enjoining implementation of the sanction
provisions of the work relief program because of the substantial
constitutional issues raised, went on to find that the Secretary
had a rational basis for approving the waiver request. 9
Similarly, in Crane v. Mathews,40 the court rejected arguments
that the Secretary exceeded his authority in approving a waiver
of the then-statutory prohibition on Medicaid copayments. As
the result of the waiver, a Georgia demonstration project was
permitted to employ copayments in order to discourage a
perceived overutilization of medical services by Medicaid
recipients. The court held that only when the Secretary's
determination was "arbitrary, capricious, and lacking a rational
basis" would a reviewing court overturn the Secretary's decision
to grant a waiver.4' The court acknowledged that an attack on
the Secretary's authority faces a "very grave obstacle," which
the plaintiffs had not overcome through their attempt to show
a lack of good faith by the Secretary. 42 Although finding that
the Secretary had authority to grant the waiver, the court
nevertheless enjoined the project, after its implementation had
begun, for failure to comply with federal regulations concerning
38. Id. (quoting California Welfare Rights Org. v. Richardson, 348 F. Supp. 491
(N.D. Cal. 1972)).
39. Id. at 1112. A federal court would have difficulty finding that similar sanction
provisions raised constitutional issues today. Cf. Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 603,
604, 609 (1987) (rejecting claims that statutes requiring the transfer of child support
payments to the state and the inclusion in the family unit of children receiving such
payments violated the Due Process and Takings Clauses). Modern commentators
believe that the Court sounded the death knell of equal protection claims for welfare
recipients in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), when it held that:
The intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems presented by
public welfare assistance programs are not the business of this Court .... [Tihe
Constitution does not empower this Court to second-guess state officials charged
with the difficult responsibility of allocating limited public welfare funds among
the myriad of potential recipients.
Id. at 487. See generally Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional
Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1277, 1283 (1993) (noting that the Supreme Court has not
invalidated a poverty classification in over 20 years).
40. 417 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
41. Id. at 542.
42. Id. at 539.
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the protection of human subjects in federally supported research
projects.43
In 1983, HHS amended its regulations specifically to exempt
changes in benefit programs from its regulations protecting
human research subjects.4 The only limitation that HHS had
ever recognized in passing on waiver requests, and the only
significant source of protection for recipients, thus was
eliminated.
II. THE SUPREMACY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT AND
AFDC ADMINISTRATION
A. The Ambivalent Effort to Enforce National
Standards in the AFDC Program
From its very beginning, the Social Security Act contemplated
a mechanism for promoting the federalism aspect of the
cooperative federalism which the Supreme Court would first
interpret a generation later.45 Federal financial participation,
the federal contribution of a fixed dollar amount per dependent
child, with states and localities adding their own self-determined
shares, came at a price. In return for federal participation, the
states were required to submit to the federal Social Security
Board a state plan, the document guaranteeing conformity to
nationalized standards of statewide administration. Initially,
state plan standards were minimal, the only absolute require-
ments being that the states contribute funds, that they operate
their aid programs from a central state agency, that they impose
43. Id. at 543-47 (discussing 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (1976)). Regulations in effect
at the time of the litigation required that projects supported by HHS involving human
subjects be submitted to an Institutional Review Board (IRB) for certification that
human subjects were minimized, that the risks to the subjects were reasonable in
relation to the benefits to the subjects, that the privacy and safety of subjects was
protected, and that the informed consent of subjects was obtained. Id. at 544 (citing
45 C.F.R. § 42.102(b)(1), (3) (1976)).
44. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(5) (1983).
45. In King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), the Supreme Court first articulated
its understanding of the relationship between the states and the federal government
in the administration of the AFDC program as one of cooperative federalism. Id. at
316. Under cooperative federalism, the states received federal funds for the distribution
of assistance, and in return were required to submit their administrative plans to the
executive department, then the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare for
approval. Id.
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no residency requirement in excess of one year, that the
programs exist in every county, and that individuals have access
to an administrative hearing system to contest denials of
claims." Certification of these standards on paper compelled
federal approval.47 If a state's implementation of its approved
plan violated any of the structural guidelines of Title IV-A, the
potential penalty was the withholding of the federal matching
funds.48
This price was imposed upon the states with a significant
degree of ambivalence. The few sections of the statute that
imposed any type of mandatory structure upon the states were
designed to correct some of the worst abuses of discriminatory
exclusion and under funding perpetrated by the Act's predeces-
sors, the mothers' pension programs.49 Compromises necessary
to shore up the tenuous support for the children's assistance
part of the Act, however, undercut its remedial intent. The
initial federal matching formula was set at a penurious level,
well below that of any other federal-benefit reimbursement
formula.5 ° This, combined with the requirement that states
46. Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, tit. IV, § 402(a)(1)-(4), (b), 49 Stat. 620,
627-28 (1935) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)-(4), (b) (1988)). Amend-
ments in 1950 extended the right of a fair hearing to persons whose claims were "not
acted upon with reasonable promptness." Social Security Act Amendments of 1950,
ch. 809, tit. III, §§ 321(a), 402(a), 64 Stat. 477, 549 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 602(a)(4) (1988)).
47. Section 402(b) of Title IV requires the approval of a state plan if it complies
with all of the elements contained in § 402(a), provided it does not impose residency
requirements exceeding the boundaries set forth in § 402(b).
48. See § 404, 49 Stat. at 628-29 (authorizing the Commissioner of the Social
Security Bureau, after notice and the provision of an opportunity for a hearing, to
withhold payments from any state whose administration fails to conform to the
Bureau's approved plan).
49. For a comprehensive history ofthe mothers' pension movement, see WINIFRED
BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN 3-19 (1963). The first mothers' pension program
began in Illinois in 1911. Forty-eight states and the District of Columbia had passed
legislation implementing such programs by 1935. Mark H. Leff, Consensus for Reform:
The Mothers'Pension Movement in the Progressive Era, 47 SOC. SERV. REV. 397, 400-01
(1973). The programs were designed to enable "deserving" destitute mothers to care
for their children at home, rather than place them in institutions. The criteria for
eligibility and the selective application processes, however, guaranteed that white
widows primarily were served, while minority mothers or mothers with illegitimate
children were closed out of the program. Id. at 414.
50. The original formula for federal contribution per dependent child arose out
of a carelessness which, according to one observer of the genesis of the Social Security
Act, typified Congress' view of Title IV as a sideshow to the Old Age Security component
of the Act. See EDWIN WITTE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 162-65
(1962). It was not until the 1950 amendments to the Act that the federal government
assumed additional payments for the administration of the program. Social Security
Act Amendments of 1950, ch. 809, tit. III, §§ 321, 402(a), 64 Stat. 477, 549 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(4) (1988)).
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choosing to participate must provide assistance in all political
subdivisions, and the Act's silence concerning the amount of
assistance payments, tempted some states to stretch payment
levels as thinly as possible. Some states conserved their funds
officially by setting payments at very low levels, and unofficially
by permitting intake workers to delay applications, and
therefore disbursements, by instituting waiting lists for
applications, and by treating requests to apply as mere
inquiries.5 The Act's major accommodation to the states was
the carte blanche it gave each grantee to "impose such other
eligibility requirements-as to means, moral character, etc.-as
it sees fit." 52 This allowed southern states to perpetuate the
same patterns of racial exclusion that they had in the past.53
Even when states were permitting county welfare offices to
exclude virtually all black families from the program, few
federal conformity hearings were held to investigate violations
of state plans.54 The absence of substantive standards in the
Act and of a strong political consensus, left the Bureau of Public
Assistance and the Children's Bureau with little statutory
guidance, and even less political support, for enforcing any
equitable norms. Although Congress addressed some of the
early abuses of the benefits application process by amending
the Act,55 its inaction on even the most blatant forms of racially
discriminatory administration of AFDC left any monitoring to
51. See generally BELL, supra note 49, at 45-46.
52. S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1935).
53. See BELL, supra note 49, at 44-45, 63-68, 75.
54. See id. at 223 n.33 (noting that only 16 conformity hearings were held between
1935 and 1961); Robert Cover, Note, Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices,
67 COLUM. L. REV. 84, 91 (1967) (same).
55. The House Ways and Means Committee's report on H.R. 6000, the Social
Security Act Amendments of 1949, noted that some agencies had stopped taking
applications because their jurisdictions provided too little money to cover all eligible
persons, and that "applicants who have already been found eligible are kept waiting
for assistance until persons on the rolls die or cease to receive assistance for other
reasons." H.R. REP. No. 1300, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1949). The Senate Finance
Committee's report on H.R. 6000 noted that the amendment required states to amend
their state plans to specify that "all individuals wishing to make application for
assistance shall have an opportunity to do so and that assistance shall be furnished
with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals" and extended the requirement
to Title IV-A, the AFDC program. The report also noted that the Senate version
changed the House's "promptly" to "with reasonable promptness." S. REP. No. 1669,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 170-71 (1950); see also Social Security Act Amendments of 1950,
ch. 809, tit. III, §§ 321(a), 402(a), 64 Stat. 477, 549 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.,
§ 602(a)(4) (1988)).
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the bifurcated administration of the children's public assistance
and child welfare programs.
The Flemming Ruling of 1961, whereby the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) forbade the exclusion
of needy children from the program on the basis of judgments
about the morality of their home environments, constituted the
first real attempt by a unified federal welfare executive to
impose national standards on state programs. 6 When, in 1968,
the Supreme Court reinforced the Flemming Ruling, it both
recognized the Social Security Act as a source of rights against
the states, and supported a new and fragile concept of federal
supremacy in welfare administration.57
This brief background illustrates that a centrally articulated,
centrally imposed norm of welfare fairness was slow to develop
and slower to implement. Even the most superficially innocuous
of the Act's principles-the equitable treatment of individual
applicants in a system of uniform statewide administration-
was designed to correct serious race-based and value-laden
disparities in the distribution of benefits. What is so shocking
to advocates who understand the hard-won history of these basic
tenets is how lightly the rush to welfare reform has cast them
aside.
B. Recent Reform Experiments and the Sacrifice
of National Standards
The desire for cost containment drives, and indeed always
has driven, much of welfare reform. The perception that welfare
costs are spiraling out of control lies close to the heart of reform
proposals. Some states have responded to this perception by
instituting across-the-board percentage cuts in AFDC, which
do not require federal approval. 8 States also may control entry
56. For a description of how the federal executive used the threat of financial
sanctions to force Louisiana to retract its "suitable home" policy, see BELL, supra note
49, at 142-45.
57. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 (1968) (holding that the inconsistency
between Alabama's regulatory definition of "parent" and the Social Security Act's
definition rendered the regulation invalid); see also Note, Welfare's 'Condition X", 76
YALE L.J. 1222, 1228-33 (1967) (outlining the manner in which HEW review of state
eligibility criteria could affect state welfare practices).
58. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (upholding Texas's "ratable
reduction" of 25% from the standard of need for payments to all AFDC recipients, as
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into the program by failing to increase their standard of need,
the largely hypothetical figure for the actual cost of living which
states must articulate, but which their payment levels need not
meet.59 Between 1991 and 1992, six states actually lowered
their AFDC payment levels and thirty-five states effectively
lowered them by not increasing them, while only eleven states
raised them.6"
It is the fear of loss of control, rather than of simple fiscal
distress, that seems to inspire the desire for the kind of changes
for which states must ask permission. The tenor of the
proposals results from popular hypotheses for the causes of the
increasing costs and growing caseloads. Central among these
is the thesis that transfer payments motivate behavior that
swells caseloads: migration across state lines to get bigger
benefits; entry into the status of single parenthood, through
either unwed motherhood or marital separation, to qualify
initially for the benefit; and production of more babies to qualify
opposed to a 5% reduction for recipients in the federal disability program and no
reduction for recipients in the old age assistance program); Rosado v. Wyman, 397
U.S. 397, 408 (1970) (stating that "[S]tates have traditionally been at liberty to pay
as little or as much as they choose'). Every state has set its payment levels well below
the federal poverty guideline. The median state benefit for a family of three in 1991
provided 41% of the guideline. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 102D
CONG., 2D SESS., OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS-1992 GREEN BOOK 637 (1992)
[hereinafter, 1992 GREEN BOOK]. One limitation on states' absolute freedom to set
their AFDC payment levels is provided in the 1988 maintenance of effort amendment
to Medical Assistance, or Title XI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(c) (1988),
which dictates the withholding of approval for state medical assistance plans for states
whose AFDC payment levels fall below those in effect on May 1, 1988. California
applied to the Health Care Financing Administration for a waiver of the maintenance
of effort provision because the reduction in its AFDC payments of 1.3% planned for
1993 would reduce payments below the critical level, following as it did the decreases
of 4.4% in 1991 and 4.5% in 1992. See 1992 AFDC §1115 APPLICATIONS, supra note
9, at 10.
59. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970) (interpreting the Social Security
Act as requiring only that the state publish its baseline standard of need); see also
42 U.S.C. § 602(h) (1988) (requiring states to reevaluate and report to HHS their need
payment standards at least once every three years in accordance with a schedule
established by the Secretary). A state may exclude from the program any family with
an unadjusted gross income, excluding some special income from dependent children
and earned income tax credit refunds, exceeding 185% of its standard of need. See
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(18) (1988); 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(xiii) (1992). Most states'
standards of need have remained constant for the last two years. 1992 GREEN BOOK,
supra note 58, at 641-42.
60. 1992 GREEN BOOK, supra note 58, at 643-45. "States," for these purposes,
may mean jurisdictions. For example, New York City's standards of need and payment
differ from standards in operation in other parts of the state. Id. Between 1970 and
1992, the median state AFDC benefit for a family of three eroded in constant dollars
by 43%. Id. at 645.
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for incremental increases in benefits.6 ' The thesis implicitly
acknowledges that the legacy of the loose federalized structure
of AFDC and of the program's history of extreme deference to
the states is one of serious systemic weakness-benefits are
penurious, and vary enormously from state to state. Of course,
the thesis blames the recipient, not the system, for the behavior
purportedly induced by the systemic weaknesses.
Of the punitive waiver-based programs born of the behavioral
thesis, the most controversial program is the family cap, which
withholds increases in the basic grant for children born after
the family has entered the AFDC program. Four states applied
to HHS in 1992 and 1993 for approval of some version of the
family cap; three proposals have been approved, with action on
another one pending.62 Another controversial measure involves
residency status. Acting on the belief that more generous
welfare benefits attract opportunists from bordering states, five
states have requested, and two have received, permission to
adopt two-tier welfare payment rates, with the lower tier
reserved for new residents.63
61. For a summary and analysis of recent welfare reform proposals which are
predicated on an assumption that assistance payments influence behavior, see Williams,
supra note 16.
62. Wisconsin's family cap proposal, approved on April 10, 1992, was the first to
be approved by HHS. The targeted group consists of teenagers living in six counties
plus Milwaukee, who have children after July 1, 1993, and who apply for AFDC benefits
for these children. See Wisconsin Parental and Family Responsibility Demonstration
Project Application (Mar. 13, 1992) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform). Those applicants will receive half the incremental increase for the
second child and no increases for subsequent children. See id. at 2; see also
Administration for Children and Families, Wisconsin Waiver Approval with Terms
and Conditions, pt. III, at 2 (Apr. 10, 1992) (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform). New Jersey's Family Development Program, eliminates any
increase in the monthly grant for children born after the family starts receiving
assistance. See New Jersey Family Development Program Waiver Request 7 (submitted
June 5, 1992, approved July 20, 1992) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform). The Georgia plan provides Medicaid and child support enforcement,
but denies additional payments for children born into families receiving AFDC for more
than 24 months. See Georgia Personal Accountability and Responsibility Project at
11-4 (submitted May 17, 1993, approved Nov. 1993) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Still awaiting federal approval is the Arkansas
plan, which extends Medicaid coverage but provides no additional payments for
additional children born to mothers over age 16. See Arkansas Reduction in AFDC
Birth Rates Project 5 (Jan. 14, 1993) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform).
63. Four of the five states requesting authority to provide lower grants to new
residents have targeted residents living in the state for fewer than 12 months. The
proposals limit grantee benefits to the level of payments in their last state of residence
or the new state of residence, whichever is lower. See California Assistance Payments
Demonstration Project 10 (Sept. 16, 1992) (on file with the University of Michigan
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A corollary of the thesis that the availability of welfare
induces behavior that prompts people to apply for, or continually
to receive, welfare is the notion that manipulation of welfare
payments can provide negative and positive incentives for
behavior that will enable recipients to forswear welfare. The
programs based on this theory of incentives target undesirable
circumstances, such as truancy from school and gaps in
preventive medical care, as the results of presumed irresponsible
parenting behavior. One of the first positive and negative
incentive programs was learnfare, in which a family's monthly
AFDC payment was reduced or enhanced depending upon the
school attendance record of the family's children.64 Other
Journal of Law Reform); Illinois Relocation to Illinois Project 2 (Oct. 1, 1992) (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Iowa Family Investment
Program, supra note 21, at 75; Wyoming Relocation Grant Project 3 (Dec. 24, 1992)
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). The Wisconsin plan
requires six months of residency before the state will disburse benefits at Wisconsin's
payment level. See Administration for Children and Families, Waiver Terms and
Conditions, pt. IV, at 2 (July 27, 1992) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform). Of the five proposals, Wisconsin's was approved, id., as was Iowa's,
Waiver Terms and Conditions (Aug. 13, 1993). California's two-tier payment plan was
approved by HHS, see Administration for Children and Families, Waiver with Terms
and Conditions (Oct. 29, 1992) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform), but enjoined in January 1993, see Green v. Anderson, 811 F. Supp. 516 (E.D.
Cal. 1993) (enjoining the two-tier program preliminarily upon a finding that California's
durational residency requirement would result in the possibility of irreversible injury
to the plaintiffs). The Illinois and Wyoming proposals were denied by HHS.
64. Wisconsin's learnfare program, in effect since 1989 in six Wisconsin school
districts, including Milwaukee, reduces families' grants for each child who fails to meet
attendance requirements. See Kronquist v. Whitburn, No. 89-C-1376 (E.D. Wis. July
23, 1992) (stipulation for final judgment). Ohio's Learning, Earning and Parenting
(LEAP) program, also in operation since 1989, provides monthly bonuses or deductions
of $62 for participating teenage parents who meet or fall short of standards for school
attendance. LEAP is mandatory for all teen parents who receive AFDC and have not
received a high school diploma or GED certificate. See DAN BLOOM, MANPOWER
DEMONSTRATION RESEARCH CORP., LEAP-INTERiM FINDINGS ON A WELFARE INITIATIVE
TO IMPROVE SCHOOL ATTENDANCE AMONG TEENAGE PARENTS at xv (1993). Virginia's
VITAL program and Illinois' One Step at a Time Project use incentives of grant
increases and bonuses to enhance school attendance. See Virginia Incentives to
Advance Learning, 1115 Demonstration Project Waiver Request 6, (June 23, 1992)
approved Sept. 1992) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform);
Illinois One Step at a Time Project 5 (Oct. 6, 1992) (approval pending) (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Still other states have initiated
learnfare by mandating school attendance under the JOBS program, a condition which
requires federal waiver of the exemption of children 16 years old and younger from
JOBS. Programs of this type for which waivers have been granted include Illinois'
Youth Employment and Training Initiative (submitted Oct. 6, 1992, approved Jan.
1993) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Missouri's
People Attaining Self Sufficiency Project (PASS) (submitted July 31, 1992, approved
Oct. 1993) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Approval
is pending for Oklahoma's learnfare Project (submitted Dec. 28, 1992) (on file with
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programs, such as Maryland's Primary Prevention Initiative,
reduce grants to families if the parents cannot prove conformity
to a schedule of immunizations and appointments for primary
medical care.65 The incentive-based (or disincentive) plans differ
from the family cap and from the barriers to in-state migration
plans in that they address behaviors removed from the core
entry issues of residency and birth status. They do, however,
share the underlying thesis that welfare produces socially
undesirable effects and that behavior responds to money.
The evidence of every hypothesis for welfare-induced be-
haviors has been shown to be empirically weak or nonexistent.
The Mecca, or welfare magnet theory, has been studied most
intensively in Wisconsin, where barriers to in-migration for the
state-funded general assistance program were enacted and
litigated as early as 1988.6 Students of the welfare migration
debate in Wisconsin have noted that its politicization caused
significant related issues, such as the number of recipients who
left the state, to go unnoted.6 7 Analyses of data drawn from
interviews conducted in 1986 with applicants for AFDC in
Wisconsin suggested that about thirty percent of recent
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), which also incorporates the JOBS
waiver for children under age 16. Maryland's Primary Prevention Initiative eliminates
special needs grants for school supplies for children who fail to maintain an 80% atten-
dance rate at school. See Maryland Primary Prevention Initiative, at 11-4 to 11-5
(submitted May 22, 1992, approved June 30, 1992) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
65. Maryland's initiative combines learnfare, with "medfare," or "immunofare."
Families lose special medical needs allowances for each child for whom the caretaker
cannot certify a medical checkup every six months and immunizations for a child
between ages 6 and 18 months. For a child between ages 19 months and 7 years, the
caretaker must prove annual checkups and the completion of immunizations. Maryland
Primary Prevention Initiative, supra note 64, at 11-4 to 11-5. Georgia's Preschool
Immunization Project imposes sanctions for an AFDC caretaker's failure to immunize
a child under the age of seven. See 1992 AFDC § 1115 APPLICATIONS, supra note 9,
at 11.
66. See Jones v. Milwaukee County, 485 N.W.2d 21 (Wis. 1992) (upholding the
state's statutory 60 day waiting period for general assistance benefits for new
residents). About two weeks before the issuance of the decision, the state legislature
amended its public assistance code to authorize the distribution of differential rates
of AFDC benefits to long-term and new residents, pending HHS approval and a favor-
able decision by the state supreme court on the issue. Act of June 3, 1991, § 10, 1991
Wis. Laws 313. HHS granted approval on July 27, 1992. See 1992 AFDC § 1115
APPLICATIONS, supra note 9, at 45. No litigative challenge to the two-tiered AFDC
system has been raised. For a discussion of the constitutional problems raised by
differential benefits schemes based on residency and on waiting periods, see infra part
III.B.
67. See PAUL E. PETERSON & MARK C. ROM, WELFARE MAGNETS: A NEW CASE
FOR NATIONAL STANDARDS 47-49 (1990).
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migrants had been motivated, in part, to move to the state by
its relatively more generous benefits. This represented about
three percent of the total applicant pool. Even these results
were clouded by the difficulty in isolating welfare benefits as
a primary motive for migration.6  Similarly, although few
dispute that long-term recipients account for a large percentage
of the AFDC caseload at any given time, and that these
recipients' backgrounds are characterized by single parenthood
and by limited job skills and education, 9 no study has proven
conclusively that welfare recipiency by itself promotes illegiti-
mate births or continued dependence on welfare.70
It is worth noting that recent increases in the number of food
stamp recipients have been greater than increases in the
number of AFDC recipients and yet have provoked far less
vociferous an outcry. 7' Eligibility for food stamps is far less
narrowly controlled than for any other public benefit; one can
be a member of the able-bodied poor and still receive food
stamps. Yet no one has called for cutting back food stamp
benefits across the board, for tying receipt of food stamps to
uncompensated community service,72 or for a "two years, up or
out" limit on receipt.
There are undoubtedly several reasons for the relative public
68. See Robert Moffitt, Welfare Reform: An Economist's Perspective, 11 YALE L.
& POLy REV. 126, 137 (1993) (finding "few consistent studies indicating that AFDC
has an impact on migration"); Thomas Corbett, The Wisconsin Welfare Magnet Debate:
What is an Ordinary Member of the Tribe to Do When the Witch Doctors Disagree?,
Focus, Fall & Winter 1991, at 19,21 (citing a 1986 survey conducted for the Wisconsin
Expenditure Commission by Paul Voss).
69. See 1992 GREEN BOOK, supra note 58, at 685-88.
70. See, e.g., Greg J. Duncan et al., Welfare Dependence Within and Across
Generations, 239 SCIENCE 467 (1988) (drawing from a 19 year Panel Study of Income
Dynamics to suggest that intergenerational poverty cannot be assumed to be a given,
because only 20% of daughters of "highly dependent" welfare recipients, defined as
those receiving welfare in each year of the two studied three-year periods, became simi-
larly "highly dependent" on welfare receipt); Moffitt, supra note 68, at 137; William
S. Wilson & Kathryn S. Neckerman, Poverty and Family Structure: The Widening Gap
between Evidence and Public Policy Issues in FIGHTING POVERTY: WHAT WORKS AND
WHAT DOESN'T 233-59 (Sheldon H. Danziger & David H. Weinberg eds., 1986)
(summarizing findings that there is no appreciable correlation between the amount
of benefits, the number of illegitimate births, and the increased incidence of family
dissolution).
71. For fiscal years 1988 to 1991, the national average of the number of persons
(including both parents and children) receiving AFDC each month increased by 15.3%.
1992 GREEN BOOK, supra note 58, at 665. The national average of the number of
persons receiving food stamps during the same period increased by 19.8%. Id. at 1633.
72. Food stamp applicants and recipients are required to register for work. 7
U.S.C. § 2015 (1988); 7 C.F.R. § 273.7 (1993).
Waivers and Welfare "Reform"
equanimity towards the explosion in food stamp use. To all
outward appearances, food stamps cost states and localities
nothing. Although the costs of larger caseloads to the city or
county departments of social services, which administer food
stamps in tandem with AFDC and Medicaid, may be consider-
able, they are hidden. Indeed, the broad availability of food
stamps to persons who qualify for no other federal or state
program acts to assuage the public conscience, as it hides the
real damage done by many states' recent elimination, or severe
curtailment, of their general relief programs." Most critically,
food stamps differ from AFDC in two important respects. First,
as an in-kind benefit, exchangeable only for food, food stamps
allow little discretion to the user. Second, the very universality
of access to the benefit actually lessens the stigma of receipt.
In contrast, AFDC affords a visible, and visibly despised
group-single mothers, perceived, however inaccurately, to be
underage, unwed, and black--carte blanche to spend cash
benefits. However meager these benefits may be, AFDC is
vulnerable to attack from those who believe that unmonitored
distribution to the profligate poor can only encourage waste,
dependency, and immorality.
74
III. CURRENT WELFARE WAIVERS AND THE ABROGATION OF
PRINCIPLES
A. The Waiver of Statewideness and Equal Treatment
As noted earlier, one of the first requirements written into the
Social Security Act was that states administer their AFDC
73. In 1991, 14 of the 28 statewide general assistance programs cut their benefits.
In 1992, eight more states reduced benefits. See STEVEN D. GOULD ET AL., CENTER
ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES & CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE STATES, THE STATES
AND THE POOR: BUDGET DECISIONS HURT LOW INCOME PEOPLE IN 1992 36 (1993).
When the District of Columbia rolled back cost-of-living increases for its AFDC benefits
by four percent in 1991, the committee report on the legislation noted that the cut
would be cushioned by the increase in food stamps that would accompany the decrease
in income. See COMMITTEE ON HUMAN SERVS., COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
REPORT ON BILL 9-159, THE "PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1982, BUDGET CONFORMITY
AMENDMENT ACT OF 1991" 6 (1991).
74. A third reason may be that food stamps are supported by the farm lobby not
as a welfare program but as a subsidy to agriculture. Cf. WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE
TRULY DISADVANTAGED 120 (1987) (arguing for universal assistance programs that
enjoy the commitment and support of a broad constituency as the only way to help
the disadvantaged).
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programs across the entire jurisdiction. 75 The requirement that
states allow all persons wishing to apply for aid to do so, and
furnish assistance to "all eligible individuals," followed soon
after.76 These principles of statewideness and equal treatment
subsequently were expanded by regulations covering all aspects
of the program. 77 Echoing the message of King v. Smith,78the
AFDC regulations prohibit states from limiting public assistance
coverage beyond what the Act or its legislative history dictates.79
Early in the program's history its administrators fought to
insinuate norms of equitable practice into the administrative
guidelines and ultimately the core statute of AFDC. These
norms included fairness in the geographical distribution of
benefits from the state level down, and fairness in the distri-
bution of benefits within each local program. These norms
substituted all too effectively for constitutional principles of
equal protection.8 ° In King v. Smith,"' for example, when the
plaintiffs called upon the Supreme Court to adjudicate the
substitute father rule as a violation of equal protection, the
Court was able to evade any constitutional ruling by relying
on Title IV-A. 2 Indeed, the litigants who prepared Kelly v.
Wyman,8 3 saw the Court's growing reliance on the Social
Security Act as a positive development. They tailored their
strategy in the case toward reinforcing the Act as the primary
source of authority for federal entitlements.
8 4
75. Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, tit. IV, § 402(a)(1), 49 Stat. 620, 627
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1) (1988)).
76. Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, ch. 809, § 329(b), 64 Stat. 477, 549-50
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10)(A) (1988)).
77. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 233. 10(a)(1) (1993) (requiring states to demonstrate that
any classifications of eligible recipients must be "reasonable" and must not
discriminate); id. § 206. 10(a)(1) (requiring states to allow anyone who wants to apply
for AFDC to do so "without delay").
78. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
79. 45 C.F.R. § 233.10(a)(1)(ii)(A) (1992).
80. See DANIEL J. BAUM, THE WELFARE FAMILY AND MASS ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE
7-8 (1974) (referencing a Letter from Edwin Yourman, former Asst. Gen. Counsel for
Social Security, HEW, to Baum (May 22, 1973)).
81. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
82. The Court in King ruled that Alabama's substitute father rule, which presumed
the responsibility for parental support of a male who cohabited with the natural mother,
violated § 406(a) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(9) (1969), which define
the "dependent child" as one who is "deprived of parental support." King, 392 U.S.
at 333.
83. 294 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd sub nom., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970).
84. See Sylvia Law, Some Reflections on Goldberg v. Kelly at Twenty Years, 56
BROOK. L. REV. 805, 815 (1990).
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B. The Waiver of Substantive Protections and
Constitutional Guarantees
1. The Right to Mobility to Secure A Better Life-That there
is no federal constitutional right to welfare benefits is virtually
axiomatic; that indigent families have the right to travel to
secure welfare benefits is equally well-established. The
prohibition on the imposition of residency requirements lasting
more than one year was written into the original Act.85 The
Supreme Court has interpreted the U.S. Constitution as
guaranteeing an affirmative right to travel to benefit from
superior economic opportunity as, first, an incident of national
citizenship,8" and later, as an absolute right in the context of
welfare receipt.
8 7
Although residency requirements in public assistance pro-
grams have long been declared unconstitutional, states recently
have attempted to revive them.8 Whereas the residency
requirements struck down in the early 1970s denied any
assistance to recent entrants, the new residency requirements
generally pay lower benefits to those residing in the state for
less than a specified period.89 Lower benefits generally are
based on the benefits payable in the state from which the
recipient emigrated. The new residency requirements are
becoming an increasingly popular way for states to cut public
assistance costs.
Only one reported case has upheld a welfare rule authorizing
the payment of less generous benefits to recent state entrants, 90
whereas two reported cases have struck down differential
payment schemes as unconstitutional,9' and additional actions
85. See The Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, tit. IV, § 402(b), 49 Stat. 620,
628 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 602(b) (1988)).
86. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-59 (1966) (confirming that
private citizens conspiring to prevent a citizen from traveling from state to state are
guilty of conspiring to hinder a citizen in exercising a constitutional right); Edwards
v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 178 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring) (interpreting the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution as guaranteeing the right
to interstate travel with respect to a California statute making it a misdemeanor
knowingly to bring an indigent person into the state).
87. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-31 (1969).
88. See Loffredo, supra note 17, at 163-67.
89. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
90. See Jones v. Milwaukee County, 485 N.W.2d 21 (Wis. 1992).
91. See Green v. Anderson, 811 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. Cal. 1993); Mitchell v. Steffen,
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are pending.92 In the face of the serious constitutional issues
raised by these proposals, HHS for the first time has denied
a state's request to conduct a demonstration project.93  In
disapproving recent requests for waivers, HHS has indicated
that it will not approve any additional residency projects until
the constitutional questions are resolved.94 Having previously
approved such projects in Wisconsin, Minnesota, and California,
however, HHS has not reconsidered any waivers that it
previously granted.
2. The Right to Equal Treatment Regardless of Birth
Status-The Supreme Court has long prohibited states from
penalizing children because of accidents of birth. Illegitimacy 95
and parental immigration status96 are two conditions for which
children obviously cannot answer and for which states cannot
make them suffer. When the Court has viewed disparate
treatment of children as the result of birth status, it has
accorded children with protections that it withheld when it
chose to view similar discriminations as mere relative depri-
vations of needs.9 v
504 N.W.2d 198 (Minn. 1993).
92. See, e.g., Aumick v. Bane, No. 2881-93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Mar. 18, 1993) cited
in INDEX & SUMMARY OF WELFARE CASES (Center on Social Welfare Policy & Law, New
York, N.Y.), Jan.-Dec. 1993.
93. The Illinois Relocation to Illinois project was disapproved on July 30, 1993.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 9, at 1. HHS also denied a waiver request by
Wyoming to conduct a similar experiment in the context of approving its "New
Opportunities and New Responsibilities" project. Wyoming New Opportunities and
New Responsibilities Project Approved by HHS, LIBR. BULL. (Center on Social Welfare
Policy & Law, New York, N.Y.), Oct. 29, 1993, at 7-8.
94. See RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 9, at 2.
95. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769 (1977) (stating "we have expressly
considered and rejected the argument that a State may attempt to influence the actions
of men and women by imposing sanctions on the children born of their illegitimate
relationships"); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968) (holding that illegitimate
children are persons under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
96. See Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), in which the Court stated:
Persuasive arguments support the view that a State may withhold its beneficence
from [illegal aliens] whose very presence within the United States is the product
of their own unlawful conduct. These arguments do not apply with the same force
to classifications imposing disabilities on the minor children of such illegal en-
trants .... [T]he children. . "can affect neither their parents" conduct nor their
own status.
Id. at 219-20 (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. at 770).
97. Compare Plyler v. Doe, 457 US. 202 (1982) (condemning Texas's withholding
of equal educational opportunity from students whose parents were undocumented
aliens) with San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), (denying
claims that students had a constitutional right to equal educational opportunity and
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Put differently, children should not suffer for their status,
or for the status or behavior of their parents. This historically
had been the approach taken by the Act's administrative
enforcers and judicial interpreters. As the Court noted in its
endorsement of HEW's rejection of the suitable home rule, "it
is simply inconceivable ... that Alabama is free to discourage
immorality and illegitimacy by the device of absolute disquali-
fication of needy children."98
Yet the various family cap and punitive "fare-type" programs
serve only to disqualify needy children in retaliation for the
behavior of other family members. That the disqualification
is relative, amounting to a diminution of the family's grant, and
not absolute, is unimportant in light of the programmatic
principles articulated in King and the constitutional principles
stated in Plyler.
New Jersey's Family Development Act9 9 contains, among other
elements, the first family cap program to receive federal waiver
approval. The family cap provision of the act is one of the few
enacted and approved welfare experimentation packages which
has met with any litigative challenge. Here the challenge came
in two forms. First, an administrative complaint filed shortly
after the passage of the act with HHS's Department of Civil
Rights Enforcement which as of the date of this writing, still
is awaiting resolution.'00 Second, a class action filed in federal
district court to enjoin the "Child Exclusion" as violating the
Act's guarantees of equal treatment, the Administrative
Procedure Act, and the federal and state constitutions. 10 1
The New Jersey cap excludes from the AFDC household, and
thus denies benefits to any child born to an adult woman
receiving AFDC. The provision clearly is aimed at deterring
pregnancy, by denying to the afterborn child and her family
that the students in question were absolutely deprived of this right). Arguably, the
students from San Antonio's Edgewood neighborhood in Rodriguez were suffering from
the accident of being born into a property-tax poor district,just as the students in Plyer
were denied a free public education by accident of their parents' immigration status.
The plight of the students in Rodriguez, however, was framed in a discourse of
fundamental rights and the substantive equal protection doctrine to which the Court
was growing increasingly hostile. The students for whom a different argument was
advanced in Plyler benefited from the lessons learned by their predecessors' misfortune.
98. King v. Smith, 392 US. 309, 326 (1968).
99. N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 44:10-19 to 10-33.
100. Administrative Complaint to HHS (June 26, 1992) (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
101. C.K. v. Shalala, No. 93-5354 (D.N.J. filed Dec. 1, 1993).
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benefits that the child would have enjoyed had she been
conceived before her family began receiving assistance." 2
HHS subsequently approved a similar cap as part of a
demonstration project in Wisconsin. The provision denies an
AFDC family the incremental increase in benefits to cover the
needs of a child born after her mother began receiving
assistance. An exception exists if the child was conceived before
the mother began receiving assistance, during a period of
nonpayment that lasted at least six months, or as the result
of rape or incest.
10 3
Any constitutional justification for a family cap can be based
only on the most superficial reading of the limited applicable
law. In Dandridge v. Williams, °4 the Supreme Court upheld
Maryland's own version of the family cap, a limitation on
incremental increases in AFDC payments for children born into
large families. The case is cited constantly, one might say
tiresomely, for the propositions that the Constitution provides
no guarantee of economic rights and that states are free to set
their own benefit levels. It also is cited tojustify the imposition
of the most minimal review of any classifications which states
make in the process of administering their welfare programs.
Dandridge constitutes the last word on judicial scrutiny of most
states' welfare decisions; indeed, so final a last word that the
judiciary seems to have treated it as a eulogy.10 5
Dandridge should not be read, however, as an endorsement
102. As Professor Williams notes:
The underlying goal of Family Cap programs is for people to plan for their
children; the assumption is that middle-class people are intelligent enough to
refrain from having children when they cannot support them and that poor women
should do likewise. The unspoken motivation is far less racially benign: the
stereotypical AFDC mother is African American, urban, lazy, and a 'bad mother"
who gets pregnant to obtain more AFDC benefits. It follows, according to the
argument, that the denial of these additional benefits will curb the pregnancies
that the policymakers find so troubling.
Williams, supra note 16, at 737.
103. CENTER ON SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY & LAw, HHS APPROVES WISCONSIN
PROJECT THAT TIME LIMITS AFDC BENEFITS 2 (1993) [hereinafter WISCONSIN PROJECT].
104. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
105. See Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness,
79 GEO. L.J. 1499, 1518-22 (1991) (describing Justice Stewart's opinion in Dandridge
as positing the Court's inability to enforce basic fairness or even rationality in welfare
policy); id. at 1528 (stating that Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Jefferson v. Hackney,
406 U.S. 535 (1972), compounds the Court's professed helplessness by assuming
helplessness in the face of the previous decision in Dandridge).
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of the constitutionality of family caps. The Dandridge Court
never dealt with the issue of whether the withholding of
additional benefits from children born after the capped limit
impermissibly penalized children by dint of their birth order.
Nor did the majority opinion address the question of whether
Maryland's AFDC cap violated the corresponding statutory
provision that requires states to afford every eligible potential
recipient of the benefit the opportunity to apply. Rather, the
Court framed the issue in terms of the states' rights to spread
out welfare benefits as they wished among large and small
families, which are constitutionally unprotected groups. This
approach allowed the Court to avoid the problem of a scheme
that withheld funding from a dependent child simply because
she had the misfortune of being born after seven equally
dependent siblings.
This issue may be less avoidable in the litigation challenging
the current cap in New Jersey. 10 6 Whereas the Supreme Court
in Dandridge could characterize the cap at issue as having the
relatively benign purpose of apportioning benefits equally
between larger and smaller families, the New Jersey provision
penalizes welfare recipients who have additional children while
on welfare, regardless of the size of their families. It thus
penalizes children born to such families.
3. The Right to Process before the Imposition of Sanc-
tions-The Social Security Act has long respected the im-
portance of process to participants in the AFDC system. The
Act's respect for process extends even beyond the guarantees
of the Federal Constitution. Thirty-three years before the Court
recognized public assistance payments as property protected
from arbitrary governmental action by the Fourteenth
Amendment, Title IV-A of the Act provided a fair hearing for
aggrieved AFDC recipients.0 7 In 1950, Congress extended to
applicants the right of redress through a fair hearing, not only
for the denial of claims, but also for unreasonable agency delay
in processing them. 1 8 In addition to providing the fair hearing
to contest the absolute deprivation of AFDC benefits, Congress
recently has established another forum-a conciliation
procedure-for recipients enrolled in the JOBS program. °9 This
extension of informal process covers not only terminations from
106. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
107. Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, § 402(a)(4), 49 Stat. 620, 627.
108. Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, ch. 809, § 321(a), 64 Stat. 477, 549.
109. See 42 U.S.C. § 682(h)(1988); 45 C.F.R. § 250.36 (1992).
SUMMER 1993]
766 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 26:4
the program, but also any issue arising out of its
implementation. It also guarantees formal fair hearing
adjudication for disputes unresolvable through conciliation." 0
The conciliation process has fallen victim to state reform
efforts through the waiver approval process. At least four states
have been exempted from the conciliation requirements."' The
states which have been granted waivers abrogating JOBS
conciliation requirements also have been granted waivers
eliminating one or more exemptions from JOBS requirements.
For example, a number of states have received waivers
eliminating the JOBS exemption for minors in school to
establish learnfare programs or to condition a minor's parents'
receipt of AFDC benefits on school attendance. 1 2 Similarly,
while a parent providing full time care to an infant under one-
year-old is exempt from JOBS requirements, 1 '3 some states have
received waivers permitting them to require such parents to
participate in employment or training programs.
114
Likewise, each of the states which have been granted waivers
abrogating JOBS conciliation requirements have been granted
waivers increasing the sanctions for noncompliance with
employment, training, or school attendance requirements. The
existing sanctions under federal law are not insubstantial. For
the first violation without good cause, an individual may have
her needs eliminated from the household's grant until her
failure to comply ceases. In the case of a second violation, the
grant is reduced for three months or until the failure to comply
ceases. In the case of any subsequent violations, benefits are
reduced for six months or until the failure to comply ceases. 5
In contrast, Iowa has been granted approval to impose a limited-
benefit plan as a sanction for families which fail to cooperate
with its Family Investment Program. This sanction provides
three months of benefits, followed by three months of benefits
for the children only, followed by the permanent termination
110. See 42 US.C. § 682(h) (1988); 45 C.F.R. § 250.36 (1992).
111. See 1992 AFDC § 1115 APPLICATIONS, supra note 9, at 23, 30, 47 (describing
projects in Maryland, New Jersey, and Wisconsin which included waivers of conciliation
requirements); HHS Approves Iowa Project, supra note 13, at 1 (describing the Iowa
project, which included a waiver of the conciliation requirements).
112. Maryland and Wisconsin each received waivers of the minor student exemptions
to run learnfare projects through JOBS. Maryland also received approval to limit the
definition of"good cause" for noncompliance. See 1992 AFDC § 1115 APPLICATIONS,
supra note 9, at 23, 48-50.
113. 45 C.F.R. § 250.30(b)(9) (1992).
114. See, for example, the New Jersey Family Development Plan. 1992 AFDC
§ 1115 APPLICATIONS supra note 9, at 30.
115. 45 C.F.R. § 250.34(a)(1) (1992).
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of benefits. HHS has waived JOBS conciliation requirements
and JOBS provisions recognizing good cause for failure to
comply for the Iowa project. 116
Procedural protections have proven crucial to prevent the
wrongful termination of benefits. Evaluations of the LEAP
program, a learnfare demonstration project in Ohio which is
being hailed as a successful model of reform in national hearings
on welfare reform," 7 suggest that teenagers were sanctioned
for absence from school at a higher rate than adults were in
workfare programs." 8 Further, when Wisconsin was forced by
court order to establish procedures for its learnfare program," 9
the sanction rate dropped drastically; nearly 85% of the
sanctions proposed by the local department of social services
prior to the establishment of procedures were later determined
to be improper.
120
When the history of this period of welfare administration is
written, the elimination of informal processes of dispute
resolution, combined with the stiffer sanctions and the elimi-
nation of exemptions for minors, mothers of infants, and other
vulnerable populations, 121 will no doubt be criticized as inflicting
serious harm on poor women and children.
IV. THREE OPTIONS FOR THE INSTITUTION OF
A WAIVER PROCESS
A. The Nature of Concerns About Current Agency Practice
Although many of the AFDC demonstration projects that HHS
has approved since 1990 have included features that benefitted
116. HHS Approves Iowa Project, supra note 13.
117. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Human Resources of the House Comm.
on Ways & Means, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (statement of Judith M. Gueron,
President, Manpower Demonstration Project).
118. See BLOOM, supra note 64.
119. See Kronquist v. Goodrich, No. 89-C-1376 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 23, 1990) (stipulation
to vacate preliminary injunction based on the parties' agreement to new procedures
for determining noncompliance and notice requirements) (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal ofLaw Reform); see also 1992 AFDC § 1115 APPLICATIONS, supra
note 9, at 50 (summarizing the issues discussed in Kronquist relating to the process
for determining noncompliance with learnfare requirements).
120. See 1992 AFDC § 1115 APPLICATIONS, supra note 9, at 50.
121. Other typical waiver requests include eliminating JOBS exemptions for
pregnant women and for those temporarily disabled. See, e.g., CONNECTICUT PROPOSAL,
supra note 13, at IV-38.
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recipients, the same projects often have denied recipients
substantive protections guaranteed in the AFDC statute.122
That the projects could violate the underlying principles of
AFDC, and yet still be approved, is the result of recent
legislative and jurisprudential developments that have vitiated
the purpose and enforceability of the statute. The last major
wave of disentitlement occurred in the 1980s as Congress passed
sweeping changes in the AFDC statute. The ease with which
Congress eliminated benefits offered in the Social Security Act
reveals the limits of the Act as a source of substantive
entitlements. 123 In upholding the changes to the Social Security
Act against constitutional attack and giving the least generous
reading to the statutory changes, the Supreme Court made clear
that recipients could no longer rely on a beneficial reading of
the Act to protect them against benefit reductions. 124 Although
by the late 1980s Congress had made some effort to restore
benefits in the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of
1982125 and the Family Support Act of 1988,126 the limits on the
ability of the AFDC statute to guarantee recipient rights had
become apparent.
122. A number of projects have liberalized categorical eligibility standards to permit
two parent families to receive AFDC benefits and have extended earned income
disregards. New Jersey, for example, adopted these innovations while simultaneously
denying benefits to children born to mothers already receiving AFDC. See 1992 AFDC
§ 1115 APPLICATIONS, supra note 9, at 30.
123. In 1981, the Reagan administration proposed sweeping changes in the AFDC
statute which reduced some of the benefits offered in the statute. These changes were
passed by the 97th Congress with little opposition. See, e.g., Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2304, 95 Stat. 857 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(17) (1988)) (adding the "lump sum rule" which disqualified
households receiving excess income for the number of months equaling the amount
of the excess income divided by the applicable standard of need); § 2301 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(A)(ii) (1988)) (limiting work expense deductions to
$75 per month and child care deductions to $160 per month).
124. One example is the "actual availability" principle which limited states ability
to attribute only that income actually available to support a dependent child. During
the 1980s, the actual availability principle gave way to deeming rules which attributed
the income of stepparents, siblings, grandparents, and alien sponsors whether or not
such income was actually available. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(7)(31), (38)-(39) (1988);
42 U.S.C.A. § 602(f)(2) (West Supp. 1993); see also Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587
(1987) (determining that recipients did not have a constitutionally protected property
interest in receiving the full amount of support payments assigned to the state in
exchange for AFDC benefits).
125. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 91 Stat. 324 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 26 U.S.C.).
126. Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
768
Waivers and Welfare "Reform"
Now that accountability to federal principles is no longer an
issue, states have rushed to use waivers to disentitle the poor
even further. The disappearance of procedural protections for
the individual recipient mirrors the disappearance of process
in the generation and approval of the recent welfare reform
programs. Policymakers at both the state and federal levels
have eschewed the establishment of procedures or standards
for waiver approvals.'27 HHS has refused both to give notice
to the public of the process it employs in granting waivers and
to articulate the standards for approval of projects. The failure
to articulate procedures for review of state waiver requests has
excluded recipients' voices from the process. Profound harms
have resulted from the failure to formalize standards for review.
The harms that have been visited upon recipients through the
waiver process may be linked to the lack of procedure and
standards for review.
In The Alchemy of Race and Rights, Patricia Williams
comments on the importance of formal rules in minimizing harm
to disempowered groups. She relates an anecdote concerning
the opposing reactions she (an African-American law professor)
and a white male colleague had to the experience of negotiating
with a landlord when arriving in a new city. While she signed
a detailed, lengthily negotiated lease with friends who rented
her an apartment, her colleague "handed over a $900 deposit
in cash, with no lease, no exchange of keys, and no receipt to
strangers with whom he had no ties other than a few moments
of pleasant conversation. " "' She concludes that empowered
people are comfortable with less formality and less procedure.
In fact, empowered people often prefer informality as a means
to establish trust between themselves and the other person with
127. The Bush administration purposely avoided articulating guidelines or standards
for approval of waiver requests, as it anticipated a need for maximum flexibility and
felt that justifications for projects could change from time to time. Telephone
Conversation with Elizabeth Barnes, Chief Program Review Officer, Administration
of Children and Families. Recent news reports suggest that the Clinton administration
does not want to be perceived as backing away from its promise to "end welfare as
we know it." See, e.g., Jason DeParle, Clinton Idea Used to Limit Welfare, N.Y. TIMES,
June 2, 1993, at A12. After a letter from advocacy groups urging HHS to establish
procedures for review of waiver applications, HHS announced it was streamlining the
process to make it easier for states to obtain waiver review. See Letter from Adele
M. Blong, Center on Social Welfare Policy & Law, to Donna Shalala, Secretary of HHS
(Mar. 23, 1993) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Press
Release from HHS (Aug. 18, 1993) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform).
128. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 146-47 (1991).
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whom they are dealing. In contrast, those whose experiences
have left them more vulnerable to being victimized rely on
formal process both for protection and as a means of being
perceived as an equal player.
129
The only acknowledged players in the waiver review process
are HHS and the state governments, actors which, at least in
theory, have relatively equal bargaining power. Williams might
analyze the absence of rules governing the waiver approval
process as promoting the sort of informality that meets the
needs of these relatively equal actors. The problem is that the
interests of a profoundly less powerful group, the recipient
community, are those most affected by the AFDC changes that
emerge, and recipient voices are excluded from the process.
Ironically, when states complained that review takes too long
and that the process needs to be streamlined, HHS responded
by establishing concurrent review of Medicaid and AFDC
waivers. 1
30
The history of welfare litigation repeatedly has demonstrated
that without an established process and standards for review,
otherwise reasonably benign eligibility conditions inflict serious
harms on recipients. The failure to articulate standards and
review procedures inevitably results in recipients suffering
arbitrary terminations. AFDC eligibility rules generally permit
the sanctioning of recipients who fail to "comply," for example,
by completing a monthly report, cooperating in pursuing
responsible relatives for support, or participating in work
activity "without good cause."'3 ' Without regulations requiring
a pretermination inquiry and an identification of what
constitutes "good cause," such eligibility rules become excuses
to deny benefits to recipients. 32
While media attention has focused on the substance of state
demonstration projects and the waivers granted in connection
129. This is not to suggest that poor people prefer formal process but simply to note
that the poor and racial minorities may be more vulnerable in settings where the
process is less formal.
130. See Press Release from HHS, supra note 127.
131. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 250.34 (1992); 7 C.F.R. § 273 22(d)(4) (1993).
132. See Anna Lou Dehavenon, Charles Dickens Meets Franz Kafka: The Malad-
ministration of New York City's Public Assistance Programs, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 231 (1989-90) (describing "churning," or the administrative closing of public
assistance cases). Even with such standards, states routinely issue termination notices
to recipients not in compliance without determining whether the recipient had good
cause for the failure to comply. See, e.g., Doston v. Duffy, 732 F. Supp. 857, 867 (N.D.
Ill. 1988) (requiring written standards for administering state AFDC programs).
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with them,133 the recent waiver decisions are equally troubling
because of a discernible lack of process and a failure to
articulate standards governing the decision to approve a
waiver. 134 Process and substance are inevitably intertwined
here; the lack of process has profoundly affected the quality of
the review of requests for waivers and has led to the approval
of harmful reductions or restrictions of recipients' benefits.
B. Sources for a Waiver Procedure and Standards
Administrative law provides one source for thinking about
the procedures HHS might usefully apply to its review of a
state's request for a waiver. Every court that has passed on
the question has found that the decision to grant such a waiver
is reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).135
It follows then that the agency must make a record sufficient
to "show that the agency has considered the relevant factors
and to enable a reviewing court adequately to review whether
the agency's decision was arbitrary or capricious." 36
The only court to consider a claim concerning the adequacy
of the agency record held that the minimal record routinely
generated by HHS in approving a waiver request was sufficient.
In Beno, California welfare advocates, on behalf of a class of
state AFDC recipients, challenged HHS's decision to grant
waivers to California which, inter alia, reduced benefits by 1.3%
statewide, except for a small control group, and authorized an
additional 5% reduction in benefits. 137 The plaintiffs sought
review under the APA, claiming that the Secretary's decision
exceeded her authority under Section 1315 because she had
133. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 16, at 720; Bussiere, supra note 16, at 1; Mark
Greenberg, Ending Welfare Law as We Know it: The New World of Welfare Waivers,
NEWSLETTER OF THE INTERUNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM ON POVERTY L., Nov. 1993, at 1;
Wiseman, supra note 11, at 18.
134. See HHS DECISIONMAKING, supra note 16, at 1.
135. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-576, 701-706 (1988); see Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090,
1103 (2d Cir. 1973); Beno v. Shalala, No. S-92-2135 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 1993) (opinion
denying defendant's motion to dismiss and denying plaintiffs' request for a preliminary
injunction) (appeal pending in the 9th Cir., No. 16-411); Crane v. Matthews, 417
F. Supp. 532, 539 (N.D. Ga. 1976); CWRO v. Richardson, 348 F. Supp. 491, 493 (N.D.
Cal. 1972).
136. Beno, No. S-92-2135, at 14.
137. This benefit reduction was justified as an experiment to determine whether
decreasing AFDC benefits would act as a work incentive.
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authorized a waiver for a project inconsistent with the objectives
of the Social Security Act and approved a target population that
was larger than was necessary to carry out any legitimate work
incentive experiment.
138
The plaintiffs' complaint did not challenge the procedures the
Secretary employed to review the waiver application. At oral
argument on a preliminary injunction motion, however, the
plaintiffs for the first time claimed that the Secretary was
required to make explicit findings that the project furthered
the objectives of the Social Security Act and that the extent and
duration of the waivers were necessary. 139 In denying the
plaintiffs' request for preliminary relief, the district court upheld
the Secretary's decision despite an almost nonexistent record.
14
For example, because plaintiffs' counsel had written to the
Secretary raising numerous objections to the waiver request
and the Secretary nonetheless granted the waiver, the court
concluded that the Secretary must have considered the
objections, even though no document existed revealing the
factors the Secretary considered.'
Despite this setback in the only case challenging the suffi-
ciency of the Secretary's procedure, administrative law
decisionmaking models could be grafted usefully onto the waiver
review process. The determination to grant waivers to a state
might be termed informal adjudication because a particular
state project is at issue. Alternatively, the agency's waiver
review process could be characterized as specific rulemaking
because the effect of a waiver decision, depending on the scope
of the project, has more or less general applicability within the
covered jurisdiction and has prospective effect.'42 Characterizing
the decision either as rulemaking or adjudication, however,
suggests a model for procedures that might be employed usefully
by HHS.
1. Rulemaking as a Model for Procedure-Rulemaking
provides one model for procedures which might be employed
by HHS in reviewing a state's request for a waiver. Under the
138. Beno, No. S-92-2135, at 18.
139. Id. at 13.
140. The record consisted of the state's waiver application, the Secretary's letter
granting the application, and a letter from the plaintiffs' counsel, objecting to various
aspects of the state's proposed demonstration project. Beno, No. S-92-2135, at 16.
141. Id. at 18; see also Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1103 (2d Cir. 1972).
142. For a discussion of the distinction between adjudication and rulemaking
decisions, see 1 CHARLEs H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.3 (1985).
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APA, an agency is required to give notice of a proposed rule in
the Federal Register and allow no less than thirty days for
public comment.
14 3
The only time that Congress addressed the procedure gov-
erning waivers, it prescribed a similar process. From 1977 to
1980 the Social Security Act and its implementing regulations
mandated procedures for granting waivers. 1" The statute, and
the Secretary's regulations which tracked the statute, permitted
proposed demonstration projects to take effect if the Secretary
approved the project no earlier than thirty days from the date
that the application was submitted. If the Secretary took no
action within sixty days, the state was authorized to proceed
with the project. The Secretary, however, was required to
publish a summary of the proposed project, make copies
available to the public, and receive and consider comments
submitted with respect to the application. No such procedure
has been employed with respect to waivers granted since
1980. 145
Although the APA exempts matters relating to benefits from
the APA's rulemaking procedures, HHS (then HEW) directed
all of its departments to follow "the public participation
procedures of 553. "146 Agencies are free to adopt such policies
foregoing the APA's subject matter exceptions and such
voluntary abrogations are then generally enforceable. Under
ordinary administrative law principles, a rule promulgated by
HHS without following the procedures in section 553 would be
void, because the agency has agreed voluntarily to follow the
procedures. 14 7
143. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988).
144. Social SecuritynAmendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, tit. IV, 91 Stat. 1554,
1562 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1315(b) (1988)). This section has been
described as governing WIN demonstration projects. See Bussiere, supra note 16, at
2. The statutory language is not limited to waivers in connection with WIN
demonstrations. The legislative history is silent on the reasons that the procedure
was added, or why the statute contained a sunset provision expiring in 1980.
145. This process may have existed more in theory than in practice. Despite the
existence of regulations requiring the publication of proposed demonstration projects
in the Federal Register, 45 C.F.R. § 282.38 (1993), a search of the Federal Register
revealed no announcement of proposals during this period.
146. See 1 KOCH, supra note 142, at § 3.36.
147. See, e.g., Ohio Dep't of Human Servs. v. United States, 862 F.2d 1228, 1233
(6th Cir. 1988) (refusing to allow HHS to rely on the benefits exemption because the
agency voluntarily had agreed to follow notice and comment procedures). The agency
retreated from its position somewhat in 1982, announcing that it would decline to follow
notice and comment procedures where it would "cause delay or would impair the
attainment of program objectives or would have other disadvantages that outweigh
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Because HHS has failed to publish, provide for, or respond
to public comment on state waiver proposals, the existing
process for waiver review has ignored almost completely the
perspectives of recipients and their advocates. The waiver
review process easily could accommodate the notice and com-
ment procedures of the APA without sacrificing efficiency.
There is some evidence that a more public process would
increase efficiency by assisting the agency in uncovering flaws
in proposed projects prior to the implementation of the project
or litigation challenging the project. 14 In several early cases
challenging the Secretary's authority to grant waivers, litigation
delayed implementation of a demonstration project. 149 Even
where litigation did not succeed in blocking a particular project,
claims raised by litigants frequently resulted in the agency
altering the project to some degree. 5 ° It simply is inefficient
to rely on litigation to deal with objections to a demonstration
project when a notice and comment procedure might well resolve
them.
2. Informal Adjudications and Standards for Review-As
noted above, Congress prescribed a rulemaking-type procedure
the only time that it considered the process applicable to waiver
reviews. It seems clear, however, that the form of administra-
tive decision making that HHS currently employs in reviewing
waiver applications is an informal adjudication model that
involves a case-by-case determination, without trial-type
procedures.
One problem with an informal rulemaking model, particularly
given the increasing number and scope of state waiver requests,
is that case-by-case review masks the extent to which waiver
decisions impact overall policy. In the context of the cooperative
federalist system of AFDC administration, for example, how
does the broad willingness of the government to grant waivers
the benefits of receiving public comment." 1 KOCH, supra note 142, at § 3.36. None
of the decisions concerning whether HHS has followed the requisite procedures under
the APA have acknowledged the agency's subsequent statement.
148. HHS appears to have invested so little in its waiver approval process that it
has not even consistently defended its decision to grant a waiver. In Green v.
Anderson, 811 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. Cal. 1993), for example, California AFDC recipients
challenged aspects of California's Assistance Payments Demonstration Project which
provided lower AFDC payments to families who were recent state entrants. The district
court invited HHS, although not a named defendant, to submit briefs, because the
court's decision might implicate the agency's waiver authority. Id. at 517 n.3. HHS
failed to respond to the court's invitation. Id.
149. See, e.g., Aguayo v. Richardson, 352 F. Supp. 462, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
150. See, e.g., Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1096-97 (2d Cir. 1973).
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affect the overall administration of AFDC? To what extent does
the increasing divergence of state eligibility rules from those
promulgated in the federal statute and regulations complicate
agency oversight of state programs? Promulgating a set of
standards to govern waiver decisions might help ensure that
these broader consequences of individual decisions are
considered.
The. only significant source of rules to govern informal
adjudications is the protection afforded by the Constitution
against deprivations of property without due process.'51
Goldberg v. Kelly established that welfare benefits were
protected property and that the loss of benefits was of such a
dire consequence as to require the opportunity for a pre-
termination hearing.'52 The lesson from Goldberg and subse-
quent decisions is that more process is due when the stakes are
highest.1
53
It is difficult to translate rules governing informal adjudi-
cations affecting an individual's access to welfare benefits into
procedures to govern waiver decisions. One reason is that
individual recipients are not parties to the waiver approval
process. Furthermore, less process is due individual recipients
with respect to congressionally mandated mass changes in
benefit programs.'54
151. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
152. 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970). In the more than 20 years since Goldberg v. Kelly
was decided, scholars have debated its meaning. The debate has centered on whether
the decision was about "new property," a theory of entitlement to welfare benefits,
or merely a recognition of the need for a more just process. One commentator has
suggested that when the government acts to inflict serious injury on someone, it must
give her a fair opportunity to be informed of what is occurring and to object to the
government's action. Law, supra note 84, at 823. Justice Brennan, who authored the
Goldberg decision, later indicated that the decision rested on the "brutal need" of the
plaintiffs, that is, that more stringent procedures are required to terminate welfare
benefits than the Supreme Court has imposed in other contexts because "brutal need"
was at stake. William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and the Progress of the Law,
The Forty-Second Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture (Sept. 17, 1987), reprinted
in 10 CARDoZO L. REv. 3, 20-21 (1988). Sylvia Law points to the risks of reliance on
the brutal need analysis, see Law, supra note 83, at 818, while others call Brennan's
"brutal need" analysis somewhat revisionist. See Owen Fiss, Reason in All its Splendor,
56 BROOK. L. REV. 789, 795 (1990).
153. Thus, the Court refused to extend the pretermination hearing requirement
to Social Security disability benefits in Mathews v, Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339 (1976).
The Court in Mathews developed a balancing test to determine the amount of process
due by weighing the importance of the private interests at state, the risk of erroneous
deprivation, the value of additional procedures, and the interest of the state in efficient
administration. Id. at 335.
154. See Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 130 (1985) (holding that recipients were
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Nevertheless, with respect to reducing entitlements authorized
by Congress, "brutal need" is at stake. Further, the changes
imposed through waivers are not mandated by Congress.1 55 In
the context of agency decisions respecting individuals, brutal
need triggered the opportunity to be heard and to object before
harm occurred. Here, at a minimum, due process should
translate into notice that the waiver application is being
considered, public notice of the process by which waivers are
granted, standards of review to govern waiver approvals, and
a record sufficient to permit judicial review of whether the
standards were followed. 156
This process, like a rulemaking process, would serve the value
of efficiency. One reason that agencies promulgate rules is to
avoid revisiting issues on a case-by-case basis. 5 ' It would save
agency resources to announce principles governing waiver
decisions, rather than revisiting this question each time that
a state requests a particular waiver.
One basic criterion for review should be that states ensure
that they have appropriate legislative authority and that their
proposals are not otherwise unlawful. 158  In at least several
instances states have submitted requests for waivers to conduct
state demonstration projects prior to enacting the necesssary
state legislation.'59 Furthermore, at least one waiver request
not entitled to an individualized notice explaining congressionally mandated reductions
in Food Stamp benefits).
155. But see Loffredo, supra note 39, at 1296-99, for a compelling critique of the
ability of the democratic process to protect the interests of recipients.
156. Our notion of standards would apply special scrutiny when HHS considers
whether to grant authority to a state to deny benefits that Congress has conferred
in the Social Security Act. Given the huge potential for harm inherent in reducing
substantive entitlements under the Act, HHS should be especially wary of a state's
request to reduce entitlements and should require a showing of the need for such a
demonstration project. Rather than encouraging benefit reductions through cost
neutrality principles, HHS should acknowledge that AFDC benefits currently fail to
meet even brutal need standard in most states, due to the decline in benefits in real
dollar terms since Goldberg was decided in 1970. Standards should be articulated
which preserve recipients' meager benefits and respect their due process rights.
157. See Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 467 (1983).
158. See CENTER ON SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY & LAW, IMPROVEMENTS IN AFDC
THROUGH HHS POLICY DEVELOPMENT: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTIONS HHS CAN
TAKE TO IMPROVE AFDC 4 (1993).
159. See, e.g., 1992 AFDC § 1115 APPLICATIONS, supra note 9, at 10, 44 (describing
the California Welfare Reform Demonstration Project and the Wisconsin Parental and
Family Responsibility Demonstration Project). For example, Vermont requested several
waivers for a project which its legislature initially failed to pass. See CENTER ON
SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY & LAW, DESCRIPTION OF THE VERMONT FAMILY INDEPENDENCE
PROJECT (1993) [hereinafter VERMONT PROJECT]. Wisconsin, at the direction of its
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approved by HHS was subsequently struck down by a reviewing
court as violating the Constitution.
160
3. Rules Governing Human Experimentation as a Source
of Waiver Procedures--a. Myth, Reality, and the Ethic of
Experimentation-Although the desire to control costs drives
many efforts at welfare reform, these motives almost never are
acknowledged in demonstration project proposals. The
willingness of the government to entertain demonstration
projects results in a kind of doublespeak where empowerment
or self-sufficiency rhetoric is used to justify proposals aimed
purely at cutting costs.
16 1
The notion of a demonstration project as a discrete experiment
often bears little resemblance to the broad-based changes
implemented through the waiver process. States routinely
request, and are routinely granted, waivers to conduct dem-
onstration projects statewide, with only a very small control
group or none at all.'62 Although waivers are granted to conduct
demonstrations statewide, often the state proposes to study only
a fraction of the recipients affected by the project. Most waivers
are granted for at least three to five years and the trend seems
to be to grant waivers for considerably longer periods.'63
States do not request the minimum number of waivers
necessary to conduct their proposed demonstration projects.
Instead, they increasingly seem to be requesting as many
waivers as they can get approved. In some cases states seek
waivers without indicating why they need them, or what they
propose to do once the waivers are granted. For example,
among the more than forty waivers Connecticut sought in
connection with its welfare demonstration project, A Fair
state legislature, sought a waiver to conduct a vehicle asset limit demonstration project
prior to the introduction of implementing legislation. See 1992 AFDC § 1115
APPLICATIONS, supra note 9, at 44.
160. See Green v. Anderson, 811 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
161. See Declaration of Jay Katz in Support of Plaintiffs Request for a Preliminary
Injunction, Beno v. Shalala, No. S-92-2135 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 1993) (stating that
"b]ecause the research design is so patently flawed, California's plan raises my
suspicions that what is proposed is not in fact a research study intended to yield
significant new information, but simply an excuse to reduce welfare benefits.")
162. Connecticut, for example, has requested waivers for two separate projects:
a time-limited experiment to be implemented in the New Haven area, and a compre-
hensive package of changes, including benefit increases, broader JOBS participation
requirements, and stiffer sanctions for noncompliance, to be implemented statewide.
See CONNECTICUT PROPOSAL, supra note .13, at IV-6 to IV-10.
163. On April 12, 1993, HHS granted seven year waivers to Vermont. VERMONT
PROJECT, supra note 159, at 1 (1993). In October 1993 it authorized an 11 year
experiment in Wisconsin. WISCONSIN PROJECT, supra note 103, at 1.
SUMMER 19931
778 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 26:4
Chance, is a request to waive all exemptions from JOBS
requirements, including those for minors in school, the tem-
porarily disabled, third trimester pregnant women, people with
children under the age of one, and people already working at
least part-time who have children under the age of six. 16 4
Connecticut offers no explanation of what it plans to require
of these previously exempt groups, except to say that it wants
to foster an ethic that work is the norm, not the exception. 16 5
Of course, if the waivers are granted, the state can impose any
requirements it wishes on these groups.
The research questions identified in the states' waiver
requests often are too vague for meaningful evaluation. 166 In
most cases the project is approved for implementation before
the means of evaluation have been identified. Failure to
formulate the research design before the project is implemented
increases the risk that the project will not be fashioned properly
to test the hypotheses on which it is based.
b. Human Experimentation Protocols as a Source of Recipient
Protections-Since the early 1980s, HHS has exempted itself,
with respect to AFDC demonstration projects, from complying
with regulations governing research on human subjects. 167 The
protocols require that an institutional review board (IRB) certify
that the project would not harm humans. If the project has the
potential to do so, the regulations require the consent of the
participant, that harms be minimized or outweighed by the
benefits to the subject, and that participant privacy and safety
be insured. 168 The agency has argued that obtaining IRB review
and obtaining each recipient's informed consent would impose
an undue burden, and would make welfare demonstration
164. CONNECTICUT PROPOSAL, supra note 13, at IV-25, IV-38.
165. Id. at IV-43.
166. Connecticut's Welfare Reform proposal, for example, proposes to test, inter
alia, the following hypotheses:
Clients will be [sic] feel they are receiving a fairer share of what society has to
offer and will feel more in control of their lives; Children will feel more hope for
the future and will have a stronger beliefthat work is rewarded; Welfare workers
will be happier with their jobs and will feel that their work is more meaningful;
The general public will believe that the welfare program is more in line with
society's values and will see welfare recipients as more deserving of the assistance
they receive.
Id. at IV-43. The proposal offers no hint as to how such hypotheses will be tested.
167. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(6) (1983).
168. Id. § 46.
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projects essentially infeasible. 6 ' The Secretary retains the
authority to require the informed consent of any participant in
a research project that she determines presents a risk to the
physical, mental, or emotional well-being of the participant.
To date, the Secretary has not conditioned her approval of any
AFDC demonstration project on the state obtaining the informed
consent of the participants. 70
It is difficult to justify the idea that protocols designed to
insure protection of human subjects should not apply to ex-
perimentation on AFDC recipients. If, as most such proposals
claim, the goals of state reform efforts truly are, to empower
recipients and increase their self worth and sense of responsi-
bility, it makes sense to obtain recipients' consent to participate
in reform experiments. 171 Any project that includes an
individualized planning process with a welfare recipient could
solicit the recipient's consent to participate in the project.172 Any
consent, of course, must truly be voluntary.'73 A recipient might
169. See Federal Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of their Motion to
Dismiss at 49, Beno v. Shalala, No. S-92-2135 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 1993) (stating that
"Plaintiffs interpretation of [law requiring protection of human subjects] amounts to
a repeal of 1115. . . ."); Crane v. Mathews, 417 F. Supp. 532, 547 (N.D. Ga. 1976)
(stating that the Secretary "claims that application of the regulation to section 1115
projects will have the effect of precluding the Secretary from conducting any section
1115 projects which involve diminution of benefits inasmuch as the regulation requires
that informed consent be obtained from each affected individual"); see also Reply to
Comments Received in Response to HHS' Decision to Exempt Itself from the
Experimentation Regulations, 48 Fed. Reg. 9266 (1983). At the time that the exemption
was proposed, the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research raised particular concerns about
research entailing the reduction of benefits to certain recipients while others similarly
situated continued to receive a higher level of benefits. Id. at 9268. The Commission
raised concerns that such projects created medical risks, as well as risks of nonphysical
intrusions into personal and confidential matters, and urged review of such projects
by an independent review board. Id. The agency rejected the Commission's suggestion,
stating that all projects "could be construed as reducing benefits in one way or another."
Id.
170. This assertion is based upon the authors' review of 26 agreements between
HHS and states which were granted waivers from 1988 through 1992, produced in
response to the authors' Freedom of Information Act request, and upon 1992 AFDC
§ 1115 APPLICATIONS, supra note 9.
171. It is instructive to note that when Congress considered the question of process
for demonstration projects it required voluntary participation by recipients. See 42
U.S.C. § 1315(b)(2) (c) (1988); 45 C.F.R. § 282.18 (1993).
172. For example, the Vermont and Iowa projects include such provisions. VERMONT
PROJECT, supra note 159; Iowa Family Investment Program, supra note 21.
173. One of the authors, as a legal services lawyer, remembers being struck by the
relatively high incidence ofvoluntary foster care arrangements among her clients, who
never seemed able to get their children back as quickly as they wanted. The National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral
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make the calculation that the benefits of the program were
worth the risk of harsher sanctions for noncompliance. Having
made that calculation and agreed to participate in the program,
a recipient might exhibit better compliance than if the project
were forced on him. A cynic would be concerned about whether
states really wanted more or less universal compliance, or
whether they are counting on the ability to sanction recipients
as a cost saving measure.
174
CONCLUSION
Since we began this project we have had numerous oppor-
tunities to speak with advocates grappling with impending state
"reform" efforts and those living with restrictions imposed upon
recipients as a result of the implementation of new state
eligibility rules. One of us recently had a conversation with a
legal services attorney who talked about a case that was particu-
larly frustrating to her.
A client came into her office to complain about something that
had happened that "just did not seem right." As the lawyer
said, it used to be that when something didn't seem right, it
wasn't. But she long since has stopped trusting her instincts
on this. The client is a recovering alcoholic and a recipient of
AFDC who would be subject to JOBS requirements, except for
her disability. The local department of Social Services recently
sent the client to see a physician for medical certification of her
Research acknowledged the problem of gaining meaningful consent from vulnerable
or disadvantaged populations. The Commission proposed three ethical principles
central to the protection of human research subjects: respect for persons (a charge
to treat individuals as autonomous agents and protect those with diminished
autonomy), beneficence (to do no harm, maximize benefits and minimize risks), and
justice. NATIONAL COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOCHEMICAL
& BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINICPLES AND GUIDELINES
FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg.
23,192 (1979).
174. The Connecticut reform proposal is instructive in this regard. One of the areas
for which the state seeks waivers is called "JOBS enhancements" in the proposal. See
CONNECTICUT PROPOSAL, supra note 13, at 35. This section reveals that most of the
enhancements involve eliminating exemptions for participation in JOBS and increasing
the sanctions for noncompliance. Id. at 36-39. In a separate document analyzing the
projected costs of the proposal, the section which spells out the costs of "JOBS
enhancements" is entitled "disqualifications." WELFARE REFORM: DDS APPROPRIA-
TIONS/REVENUE (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). The
disqualifications entail substantial savings.
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disability. The client had been examined by the doctor who
presumably returned a report to the department verifying the
client's disability.
When the client went to her next recertification appointment,
her worker handed her a notice that her needs would be
eliminated from her grant in thirty days unless she enrolled
in an alcohol rehabilitation program. Apparently, her doctor
had completed the employability form indicating that part of
the client's disability had to do with alcoholism. The depart-
ment may require recipients to participate in alcohol treatment
as a condition of eligibility.
The rules authorize the department to give a recipient thirty
days to seek treatment and, if the recipient fails to comply, the
department may sanction the recipient by eliminating her needs,
though not those of her children, from her grant. Here, the
department had collapsed the notice requiring the client to seek
treatment and the notice reducing her benefits into one. She
was being terminated from assistance for failing to do something
which she had never been requested to do.
175
This seemed unfair to the client; and the attorney identified
the violation of law. The correct procedure would have been
to send the client a notice telling her that she had thirty days
to seek treatment and to provide the department with satisfac-
tory assurance that she was participating in such treatment.
If the thirty days passed and the department did not receive
the certification, it then could send her a notice proposing to
reduce her benefits. 176
When the lawyer attempted to communicate the problem to
the worker, however, the worker did not seem to understand
what the lawyer meant. The lawyer then called the worker's
supervisor, again in vain. The supervisor claimed that he had
checked out this process with state officials and had been
assured by the state that the local procedure was appropriate.
And what was the big deal after all, the supervisor wanted to
know. If the client indeed sought treatment and provided proof
to the department that she was enrolled in a program then her
benefits would not be reduced. If there was any dispute about
175. Furthermore, it appears to be impermissible to sanction an unemployable
recipient for failure to accept supportive services under JOBS. See 43 C.F.R. § 250.34
(1993).
176. Federal regulations as well as elementary notions of due process would require
that she have at least 10 days' notice prior to the termination of her benefits. See 45
C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(4) (1993).
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compliance and her benefits were cut off, she could always
request a fair hearing. The problem with that approach, as the
lawyer pointed out, was that if the client waited until her
benefits were reduced to dispute the department's decision, the
client would not be receiving aid during the hearing process.
Thus, she would be fighting about whether she had complied
with the department's requirements while not having enough
money on which to live.
In fact, the lawyer believed that this client was very re-
sponsible. She already was checking out alcohol treatment
programs. She would, no doubt, do everything she could to
comply with the department's conditions.'77 If all went well,
she probably would not be sanctioned. "I really don't have time
for these due process problems," the lawyer said, "but it really
makes me angry that the department doesn't seem to under-
stand what I'm talking about. They think I'm just a crazy
lawyer talking about due process."
In Connecticut, some legal services advocates attempted to
respond to the state's omnibus waiver proposal before it was
submitted to HHS. In order to respond to the proposal, one
advocate met with a group of women who receive AFDC and
wrote a letter summarizing the group's comments on the
proposal. The result suggests that despite the barriers that
have been erected to meaningful participation, recipients have
valuable insights concerning changes in the benefit programs
that affect them.
178
Recipients repeatedly expressed concerns about how the
proposed rule changes. in the demonstration project would be
implemented. For instance, the group of recipients raised
questions about how fairly the proposed sanctions would be
administered. 179 With respect to additional benefits offered in
the proposal, the women were concerned that they might only
be available in theory, but not in practice. In these women's
experiences, workers regularly failed to tell them about benefits
177. Whether a client is in compliance, however, is not as straightforward as it
might seem. We have known clients who were participating in outpatient alcohol
treatment programs, yet nonetheless were sanctioned because the department required
participation in an inpatient program, which the client, fearing the loss of her housing
during the period of hospitalization, refused.
178. It is important to acknowledge, however, that in this case the recipient's views
were filtered by the legal services attorney who heard them and were included in the
attorney's comments on the state's proposal.
179. This concern was based on the fact that the proposal would subject a greater
number of recipients to work rules and impose harsher penalties for noncompliance.
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that are available, so they were suspicious that anyone would
be notified of the availability of these new benefits.8 0 The
women also commented on the stigma of being on welfare and
the misleading and inaccurate ways in which they were
portrayed in the proposal and in the welfare debate generally.'
18
In his first State of the Union address, President Clinton
reiterated the commitment to welfare reform that he had
expressed in his campaign. His administration has yet to
present its reform proposal, though it plans do so soon. Reform
is already under way, however, because he has permitted state
experimentation to flourish. 82 Trust us, President Clinton
seems to be saying, our plan will be ready soon. Trust the
states too; they often have great ideas.
Recipients, meanwhile, seem to be saying, trust has never
worked very well for us. It is hard for us to keep track of the
rules; no one tells us about the helpful ones and the harmful
ones often seem to be administered unfairly.'83 To the extent
that advocates have been successful in protecting their clients
against the arbitrary practices of states and localities, they have
relied upon rules, standards, and process. Advocates worry that,
180. Uncovering theory by looking "to the bottom" is the methodology used by critical
race theorists. See generally Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal
Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987); Lucie E. White, No
Exit: Rethinking Dependency from a Different Ground, 81 GEO. L.J. 2001 (1993)
(arguing for an effort to incorporate the stories of poor women into the debate on
solutions to poverty).
181. It is too soon to tell whether these recipients' concerns had any real impact.
In its final version of the proposal, the state revised some of the language it used to
characterize recipients. There were no assurances offered, however, concerning how
new benefits would be publicized, or how new requirements or sanctions would be
administered.
182. State of the Union: Excerpts from President Clinton's Message on the State
of the Union, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1994, at A16 ("People want a better system, and
we ought to give it to them. Last year we began this. We gave the states more power
to innovate because we know that a lot of great ideas come from outside Washington,
and many states are already using it.").
183. Theresa Funiciello poses a riddle describing welfare in hauntingly familiar
terms as follows:
Besiege the families with red tape. Find and use every opportunity to tell the
parents, especially the mothers that they are inferior human beings .... Make
sure the kids hear. At least once monthly have a politician of some stature make
them the target of everyone else's woes .... Change the rules several times a
year. Keep the rule changes complex and quasi-secret, so they can't"comply". ....
Send in researchers; study the people, make them feel like animals in a zoo.
Wonder why they don't like you.
THERESA FUNICIELLO, TYRANNY OF KINDNESS, 311-12 (1993).
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at least when it comes to approving state waivers, no one can
see the core values anymore and those granting the waivers do
not seem concerned about what recipients or their advocates
have to say.
We do not suggest that all experimentation is harmful. 8 4 It
should be recognized, however, that advocates and recipients
have perspectives on the system that presidents, policymakers,
and states do not. For all the rhetoric of reform and trust, of
fair chances and family protection, the conclusion from below,
that many of the changes approved by waivers will cause only
more harm, is inescapable. Unless procedures and standards
for reviewing waiver applications are put in place soon, the
President may find that his administration has ended welfare
as we know it in a way he never intended and in the process
damage the poor families he intended to assist.
184. In fact, many states have sought waivers which, inter alia, expanded eligibility
for AFDC by, for example, liberalizing rules making benefits available to two parent
families, increasing earned income disregards and increasing asset limits. See 1992
AFDC § 1115 APPLICATIONS, supra note 9.
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